Introduction
The application of the principle of mutual recognition to judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the European Union (EU) has resulted in the paradigmatic tension between punishment and its internal limits, namely the deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution function of punishment, as well as its external limits, namely fundamental rights. On the one hand, there is the effectiveness of national systems of criminal justice. Mutual recognition increases the likelihood of prosecution and conviction of offenders, which has a noteworthy deterrent effect on potential wrongdoers. On the other, some of these measures pursue (also) rehabilitation. Furthermore, fundamental guarantees such as the right to liberty are particularly under the spotlight, which reinforces the dialectic with limits of punishment. The right to liberty is one of the rights particularly under the spotlight when it comes to judicial cooperation as between member states. There are at least four legislative measures applying mutual recognition to criminal matters that directly involve deprivation of liberty: the Framework Decisions (FDs) on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), the transfer of prisoners, probation measure and pre-trial orders alternative to detention ('European Supervision Order' or 'ESO FD').
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The Explanations to Article 6 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights ('CFREU' or 'the Charter') -stating the right to liberty and security of person -clarify that 'The rights in Article 6 are the rights guaranteed by Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), and in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, they have the same meaning and scope'. Article 5 ECHR, in turn, stipulates that no one shall be deprived of liberty, save in a closed list of cases and in accordance with the procedures established by law. One of these grounds is Article 5(1)(f) ECHR, allowing the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. The test elaborated by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for reviewing states' laws and practices requires that deprivation of liberty in the context of extradition be: carried out in good faith; closely connected to the grounds of The absence of a proper assessment in terms of proportionality from the arbitrariness test has been criticised in the context of the ECHR. 3 The application of that test to mutual recognition might be even more controversial. The principle of proportionality is a cornerstone of the CJEU's review of rights restrictions by the Union or member states, and is now crystallised in Article 52(1) CFREU.
Furthermore, other connotations of the principle of proportionality can be highly relevant to the right to liberty within mutual recognition in criminal matters: in particular, proportionality of penalties to the seriousness of the offences as stated in Article 49 CFREU. 4 This article assesses the existing framework of EU law concerning the right to liberty and mutual recognition from the specific perspective of proportionality under Article 52 CFREU. Firstly, the paper introduces the benchmark of analysis of this research, namely the different principles of proportionality in EU law. Secondly, the key features of mutual recognition in criminal justice are outlined. Thirdly, the two main scenarios of this research are analysed: on the one hand, the EAW FD and the CJEU's interpretation; on the other, the three FDs on transfer of prisoners, probation measures and the ESO.
The conclusions reveal that, in spite of increasing attention payed to proportionality and the right to liberty in mutual recognition, there are thorny issues left unanswered by the EU institutions.
The Principle(s) of Proportionality in EU Law
The right to liberty requires that rules allowing for deprivation of liberty be drafted, enacted and enforced in accessible and foreseeable way (legal certainty), and in compliance with the principle of proportionality. 5 As found by the CJEU, the right to liberty protects against arbitrariness through the requirement that detention rest on a clear, predictable and accessible legal basis. in terms of its suitability, necessity and proportionality stricto sensu. 11 The suitability test evaluates appropriateness of the means (the restriction) in relation to the achievement of the objective pursued.
The necessity test implies that the measure chosen is the least intrusive measure for the right or freedom restricted, on condition of being equally effective to meet that objective. The proportionality stricto sensu will be complied with if the means adopted does not impose an excessive burden on the right. 18 Firstly, it abolishes the principle of dual criminality (although not in all cases); secondly, it allocates the responsibility for the surrender on judicial rather than political authorities; thirdly, it (almost completely) drops the prohibition for a state to extradite its own nationals (also referred to as 'nationality exception' or 'nationality ban').
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The cooperation on a given order (eg arrest warrant) is regulated by specific legislative instruments adopted at EU law level. Major concerns have been voiced towards the inadequate level of individual safeguards. 20 Part of the criticism are related to the conceptual centrepiece of mutual recognition, namely the principle of mutual trust. The principle amounts to the debatable presumption that Member
States act in compliance with fundamental rights. 21 The next section analyses the impact of the four FDs on the right to liberty from the perspective of the principle of proportionality, and shows how problematic such a presumption can be.
The Right to Liberty, Proportionality and the European Arrest Warrant

The European Arrest Warrant
The European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision
The EAW aims to replace extradition procedures with a smoother and swifter system of surrender between judicial authorities to try the person concerned or enforce a penalty already issued. While recognition, the FD shall not the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 TEU.
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The FD sets precise deadline for recognition and execution. 23 The executing judge must decide whether the person arrested must be kept in detention pending the decision on the recognition. Release may be ordered, provided that measures are taken so as to ensure that the person will not abscond. 24 The issuing state must deduct the period of detention already served by the person from the total period of detention to be served therein. 25 The FD provides that the recognition and execution of the EAW can be refused on the basis of mandatory and optional grounds for refusal of execution. None of these grounds, however, gives national authorities the possibility to refuse the execution of an EAW for (past or potential) fundamental rights violations. The following section discusses the CJEU's interpretation of the right to liberty and the principle of proportionality in the context of the EAW FD.
The CJEU's case law on EAW liberty and proportionality
In the Court's case-law, the relevance of the principle of proportionality and the right to liberty has Radu regarded the issuance of EAWs against a Romanian national who claimed that his defence rights had been violated. 26 The Court was asked as to whether the EAW must satisfy the requirements of necessity and proportionality, and its execution can be refused in case of (actual or potential) violations of Articles 5 and 6 ECHR or Articles 6, 48 and 52 CFREU. The AG Sharpston recalled the arbitrariness test elaborated by the ECtHR (good faith; connection to detention relied on by the judicial authority; appropriate detention conditions; reasonably length). Furthermore, she suggested that the execution of a EAW may be refused on fundamental rights ground (in particular Articles 5 and 6 ECHR and/or Admittedly, Mr Radu argued that his rights had been violated because he had not been summoned by the issuing judge before the EAW was issued. The question posed by the referring court had to do, more broadly, with the possibility to refuse the execution of a EAW on the basis of a fundamental rights breach. Granted, references for preliminary rulings always arise from a concrete case, and the violation of fundamental rights in the case of Mr Radu could be questioned. Unlike the AG, the Court seemed to completely close the door, at least at that moment, to considering breaches of fundamental rights as a basis for refusing the execution of a EAW.
In Lanigan, the questions referred concerned the interpretation of Article 17, read in conjunction with
Article 15, and Article 12 EAW FD. Articles 17 and 15 establish procedures and time-limits for the decision on the execution of a EAW, whereas Article 12 provides for the possibility, for the executing judge, to order the provisional release of the person concerned during execution procedures. 29 The Court found that the expiring of the time-limits neither precludes the execution of the EAW, nor creates a general and unconditional obligation to release the person. Such an interpretation 'could limit the effectiveness of the surrender system put in place by the Framework Decision and, consequently, obstruct the attainment of the objectives pursued by it'. 30 However, the CJEU found that Article 1(3)
determines an obligation to interpret the EAW FD in compliance with the Charter: in this specific case, Articles 6 and 52 CFREU. 31 As for the right to liberty, the CJEU relied on the ECtHR's case-law on Article 5(1)(f) ECHR (which, however, refers to the right to liberty in the context of extradition procedures). In particular, the right to liberty would result in the duty, for the executing judge, to hold that person in custody so long as the procedure for the execution are carried out in a sufficiently diligent manner. The executing judge is required to consider factors such as: the possible failure to act on the part of the authorities of the Member States concerned; any contribution of the requested person to that duration; the sentence potentially faced by the requested person; the potential risk of that person absconding; the fact that the requested person has been held in custody for a period the total of which greatly exceeds the time-limits stipulated in Article 17. Should the judge opt for release, measures should be adopted to ensure that the material conditions necessary for the surrender remain fulfilled. could not be met because of the continuing offender's resistance to execution of the EAW. While the CJEU confirmed that states are not exempt from the obligation laid down in the FD once the deadline for the new surrender has expired, it also found that there is no obligation of release where the second attempt at surrendering within the deadline is prevented by circumstances beyond states' control. 33 The executing judge has discretion under Article 12 FD as to whether the circumstances allow for freeing the person concerned. 34 The margin for detaining beyond the terms expressly provided in the FD is considerably broadened.
A seminal judgement for the operation of the EAW FD was issued in Căldăraru. The CJEU had to deal with the possibility to refuse the execution of an EAW on the basis of the risk of inhumane treatment in the issuing Member States (Romania and Hungary), due to poor detention conditions. 35 The AG Bot argued that reading Article 1(3) as a possible ground for refusal based on potential fundamental rights violation would be contrary to the structure of the system, and undermine the relationship of trust amongst Member States, on the one hand. On the other hand, the principle of proportionality would require that the issuing judicial authority carry out a review of proportionality when issuing a EAW, even disapplying its national legislation imposing the principle of mandatory prosecution, if necessary.
As far as the executing judicial authority is concerned, the latter might ask the issuing judicial authority for any information necessary to enable it to assess whether surrender of the requested person is likely to expose him to detention conditions that are disproportionate. 36 On being a general principle of EU law, proportionality could be relied on to refuse the execution of a EAW. According to the AG, detention conditions would be proportionate where: they do not result 'in the detachment from society of the person concerned', in the case of a EAW issued for execution purpose; they remain strictly related to the aim of prosecution, in the case of a EAW issued for that purpose. The issuing judge, on its part, is called on to apply a proportionality check, and issue a EAW by taking into account the nature of the offence and the regime of execution. Broadly, the issuing Member State should take all necessary measures, including reforms of criminal policy, to ensure that that person serves his/her sentence in conditions which respect fundamental rights. residence of the person to whom the arrest warrant applies, in conjunction with a curfew. Before the referring court, JZ had requested that the period during which he was subject to a curfew in the UK and to electronic monitoring be credited towards his custodial sentence.
Firstly, the Court pointed out that the national judge has to interpret national law, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the FD. 39 Article 26(1) EAW FD makes no express reference to the law of the Member States, which means that its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the EU. 40 The terms 'detention' and 'deprivation of 
Proportionality and The Right to Liberty in the EAW
The possible application of the principle of proportionality in the context of the EAW has been heavily debated. 45 What the case law discussed above shows is that both the issuing and executing state have a key role in protecting the right to liberty. Leaving aside the responsibility of cooperating with each other imposed by the FD in different provisions, the issuing judge comes into play especially before issuing and following the execution of the EAW. Article 26 EAW FD reveals that proportionality is at stake even once the EAW has been implemented. Proportionality of penalties under Article 49 CFREU would require the issuing judge not to issue a EAW for particularly petty or tame offences. Furthermore, in JZ Articles 49 and 6 CFREU were used to allow the issuing judge to apply its own definition of detention, should this amount to a higher level of protection. It should be remembered, however, that such leeway was left in a situation where the enforcement of the EAW had been secured, with the person concerned surrendered to the issuing state. This seems to confirm a contrario the Melloni principle that higher national standards can be applied as long as they do not jeopardise the effectiveness of the EAW. (2) to (4) -to situations where the delay was caused by the surrender. However, the CJEU more broadly phrased its objection as based on situations beyond Member States' control, so potentially including cases where the person bears no responsibility. The accent posed in Vilkas on Article 12 FD -allowing the executing judge to order the release -confirms the role for the executing state in terms of the right to liberty and proportionality, without however providing guidance to balance the discretion left by that ground for extended detention.
What should be firmly rejected is the argument put forward by the AG in Căldăraru, where the principle of proportionality was used to consider refusal of execution for possible violations of Article 4 CFREU.
When breaches of absolute rights/prohibitions are at stake no room for proportionality can possibly be made: the balance inherent in the use of proportionality is incompatible with absolute prohibitions. The application of the former to the latter is misleading and unacceptable, as well as legally wrong.
The FDs on Transfer of Prisoners, Pre and Post Trial Measures Alternative to Detention
The Legal Framework
The three FDs on the transfer of prisoners, probation measures and pre-trial measures alternative to detention are highly relevant to the right to liberty. Deprivation of liberty is involved in two ways.
Firstly, the coercive transfer implies logically a form of deprivation of liberty. Secondly, they all see the person being deprived of liberty before the decision recognised and the transfer executed. As shown below, this makes 'hiccups' of the system particularly relevant with regards to the ESO and probation measures FDs. After the transfer is completed, the individual will be subject to a new legal regime, which will differ from that of the issuing state, with the possibility of different rules concerning the 
Proportionality and Procedural Rights of the Individuals
The FDs are relevant to proportionality under Articles 6 and 52 CFREU. to the principle of proportionality, which in turn implies relating the particular limitation to the objective pursued. In this sense, the FD on the transfer of prisoners pursues the reintegration of the person concerned. The same goes for the FD on probation measures, where rehabilitation sits next to the improvement of monitoring and public safety. The ESO FD aims to increase public security, and the right to liberty and the presumption of innocence.
Firstly, the absence of procedural guarantees should be mentioned. The FDs are completely silent as to the procedures to be followed when adopting the decision on the transfer: no individual rights are provided for in this respect. The FD on probation measures and the ESO FD are 'triggered' at the request of the person concerned. Also, in these cases the individual will be subject to deprivation of liberty, as s/he will be transferred to the executing Member State. However, these instruments do not ensure an adequate level of participation of the person concerned in the procedures of recognition, nor that the person is aware of differences between the two legal systems. 55 As counter-objections, it might be argued that Member States would be individually responsible for establishing the relevant procedures, and that the FD on transfer of prisoners would operate in a situation where the persons concerned are already deprived of liberty. The division of labour between EU and state law may not be justification for situations of legal vacuum or uncertainty, nor for discharging the fundamental rights obligation on the part of the Union. 56 Since the established procedure requirement applies to enforcement of detention as well, doubts can be raised about the proportionality of the lack of clear procedures -and of individual rights -in relation to the aim of the FDs.
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Issues of proportionality emerge from the grounds for postponing the transfer. The three FDs provide that the transfer may be suspended until further notice when exceptional or unforeseen circumstances occur. The provision raises two main concerns. Firstly, the suspension knows no temporal limit, which means -especially in the case of probation measures and the ESO -prolonging detention sine die at the expenses of personal liberty. The rule is even more problematic when one considers the grounds underlying its application. Exceptional or unforeseen circumstances is a one-size-fits-all case for continuing detention that appears hardly compatible with a proportionate deprivation of liberty. On the one hand, the rationale of that specific rule is obscure. On the other, the problem remains even where that extended detention is 'balanced' against the broader objectives of the FDs. The measure has no bearing whatsoever with reintegration, let alone the right to liberty or the presumption of innocence. Public security is the only plausible justification in this respect. However, when public security creates a space of wide discretion for public powers, it should be invoked explicitly and defined restrictively.
The third remark concern the standard of protection cleavage dividing the three FDs, on the one hand, and the EAW, on the other. There is indeed a sharp contrast between the two sets of measures. We have seen that the four FDs have significant impact on the right to liberty. Furthermore, mutual recognition
procedures cannot be considered a form of criminal proceedings, although they are inextricably linked to the latter. Therefore, the application of procedural fundamental rights such as Article 47 CFREU to those procedures might be not exactly straightforward. The EU has adopted directives establishing common rules on the following rights in criminal proceedings: interpretation and translation;
information; access to a lawyer; legal aid; safeguards for children suspected and accused in criminal proceedings .58 As scope of application, the Directives lay down rules concerning these rights (1) in criminal proceedings and (2) proceedings for the execution of a EAW. 59 Therefore, the EU legislature acknowledges the difference between these two kinds of procedures. The Directives reduce the existing distance of standard of protection between criminal proceedings, on the one hand, and the EAW, on the other. This improvement has not involved the other three FDs, although they have significant implications in terms of the right to liberty as well. It is true that the Directives apply until the final judgment, so that the recognition of custodial and alternative penalties would fall outside their scope anyway. The same may not hold true for the ESO, which concerns the recognition of pre-trial measures other than detention. This nonetheless, one can see a clear cleavage between procedural rights standards in the legal universe constituted by the intra-EU transfer of persons related to judicial cooperation.
The legal framework set out by the FDs challenges the established procedures requirement inherent in the right to liberty. Serious concerns can be voiced about the proportionality of these measures with the objectives of the instrument, be they reintegration or public safety.
Concluding Remarks
The automaticity in inter-state cooperation in criminal matters introduced by mutual recognition has inevitably called for balances in terms of fundamental rights protection. The right to liberty is significantly involved in this process of streamlining the traditional mechanisms of extradition. 
